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Abstract
Research in corporate governance and labour law has been characterised by a
disjuncture in the way that scholars in each field are addressing organisational
questions related to the business enterprise. While labour has eventually begun to
shift perspectives from aspirations to direct employee involvement in firm
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management, as has been the case in Germany, to a combination of ‘exit’ and
‘voice’ strategies involving pension fund management and securities litigation, it
remains to be seen whether this new stream will unfold as a viable challenge to
an otherwise exclusionary shareholder value paradigm. At the same time, recent
suggestions made by Vice Chancellor Strine of the Delaware Chancery Court to
dare think about potentially shared commitments between management and
labour underline the viability of attempts at moving the corporate governance
debate beyond the confines of corporate law proper.
This paper takes the questionable divide between management and labour
within the framework of a limiting corporate governance concept as a starting
point to explore the institutional dynamics of the corporation, thereby building on
the theory of the innovative enterprise as developed by management theorists
Mary O’Sullivan and William Lazonick. Largely due to the sustained distance
between corporate and labour law scholars, neither group has effectively
addressed their common blind spot: a better understanding of the business
enterprise itself. In the midst of an unceasing flow of affirmations of the finance
paradigm of the corporation, on the one hand, and ‘voice’ strategies by labour,
on the other, it seems to fall to management theorists to draw lessons from the
continuing coexistence of different forms of market organisation, in which
companies appear to thrive. Exploring the conundrum of ‘risky’ business decisions within the firm, management theorists have been arguing for the need to
adopt a more sophisticated organisational perspective on companies operating
on locally, regionally and transnationally shaped, and often highly volatile,
market segments. Research by comparative political economists has revealed a
high degree of connectivity between corporate governance and economic
performance without, however, arriving at such favourable results only for
shareholder value regimes. Such findings support the view that corporate
governance regimes are embedded in differently shaped regulatory frameworks,
characterised by distinct institutions, both formal and informal, and enforcement
processes. As a result of these findings, arguments to disassociate issues of
corporate governance from those of the firm’s (social) responsibility (CSR) have
been losing ground. Instead, CSR can be taken to be an essential part of understanding a particular business enterprise. It is the merging of a comparative
political economy perspective on the corporation with one on the organisational
features, structures and processes of the corporation that can help us better
understand the distribution of power and knowledge within the ‘learning firm’.
Keywords: corporate governance, innovative enterprise, learning firm, employee
involvement, corporate social responsibility, German corporate governance.
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INTRODUCTION

The role of the employee in the corporation is manifold. Starting with their
performance of various functions, determined by the superiors, employees often
play a much more differentiated role in the functioning of an organisation. It is
obvious then that the form of the organisation – a small or middle-sized firm or a
large, publicly traded corporation with operations around the world – has a direct
impact on the role of the employee. This first observation is important if we want
to avoid pursuing the question ‘what role for employees in the corporation’ in a
one-size-fits-all manner. The size, structure, and embeddedness 1 of the corporation, as recently highlighted again by Sanford Jacoby,2 are directly related to our
assessment of the role and involvement of employees in the organisation. In turn,
the shape of the organisation is driven by developments in the political economy,
of which the corporate, labour law and industrial relations regimes each form a
part. This regulatory framework is increasingly less a domestic affair. The
increased liquidity of funds available for the financing of corporate operations
worldwide has been undercutting, informing and pushing domestic policy
developments. It is thus no surprise that our view on what are the ‘leading
political economies’ shifts with the particular regime’s aptness and capacity to
adapt to the changing structures of world markets. Two interim conclusions
follow: (1) corporate governance forms part of a larger regulatory framework
which is constantly under pressure of being adapted at the domestic and, increasingly, transnational level to the capabilities of global investors and capital flows;
and (2) any assessment of the involvement and role of employees in the firm has
to be made with this complex background and framework in mind.
The following observations provide a few examples in support of the above
two statements. The second section will address the current state of research into
employee involvement in the firm from a comparative perspective and argue how
issues of employee involvement are being shaped by contemporary developments
.

——————————————————

1 For the origin of this concept, see Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political
and Economic Origins of Our Time (New York, 1944). It was subsequently further elaborated
with a focus on networks by Mark Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The
Problem of Embeddedness’, 91 American Journal of Sociology (1985) p. 481; and Mark
Granovetter, ‘The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes’, 19 J. Econ. Persp.
(2005) p. 33). Critical of the concept is Jens Beckert, The Great Transformation of Embeddedness: Karl Polanyi and the New Economic Sociology, Max Planck Institute for the Study of
Societies, Discussion Paper 07/1 (2007), who reads ‘The Great Transformation’ as ‘as a social
theory’ and argues that a focus on networks fails to appreciate the more complexly structured
market as framework of economic activity, on the one hand, and to address Polanyi’s concern
with the consequences for ‘social order and political freedom when economic exchange is
organized chiefly through self-regulating markets’, on the other. Ibid., at p. 17.
2 Sanford M. Jacoby, The Embedded Corporation: Corporate Governance and Employment Relations in Japan and the United States (Princeton, Princeton University Press 2004).
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in corporate governance. The next section will study in more detail the case of
German co-determination in order to show how a long-held misconception is
applied to what is and what is not ‘bad’ co-determination in German companies.
It will also place this discussion in the context of current EU law-making in the
area of corporate governance. The fourth section, then, will suggest an alternative
perspective on employee involvement in the firm, one primarily informed by
insights provided by management studies, organisational science and scholars of
historical political economy. These scholars suggest a differentiated understanding of the firm, where managerial success and economic performance depend on a
set of institutional features inside and outside of the firm, encompassing communication and the creation and dissemination of knowledge between different levels
of employees 3 and between the firm and societal knowledge actors. Couched in a
vivid culture of incentive structures and adaptation techniques, which enhance
collaborative efforts, experimenting and learning, the corporation can thus be seen
as an integral part of a highly differentiated knowledge society.
.

2.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Research into the role and involvement of employees in the contemporary
business corporation, be it a small-scale, domestically or regionally operating
enterprise or a large multinational corporation, reflects the larger trends in
corporate governance and business organisation. We can differentiate between a
human resources approach and a co-determination or control approach. The latter
has been the much discussed model of German corporate governance, about
which we will speak later in more detail. The former can be found, expressed in a
very strong form, in Japanese corporate law and, in a weaker form, in the US
corporate form. Co-determination comprises different forms of employee
involvement in the management of the company. In contrast, a model focusing on
human resources, can unfold without granting workers substantive input into
management issues of the firm. Japanese corporate governance was hailed all
throughout the 1980s as a model nurturing stable employments, skills training and
intra-firm mobility.4 The human resources manager would regularly be part of the
——————————————————

3 Granovetter (1985), loc. cit. n. 1, at p. 501: ‘When many employees have long tenures,
the conditions are met for a dense and stable network of relations, shared understandings, and
political conditions to be constructed.’
4 See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, ‘Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and
the United States’, 102 Yale. L. J. (1993) p. 1927. With a view to the changing dynamics of the
political economy of such regulations, see Luke Nottage, ‘Japanese Corporate Governance at a
Crossroads: Variation in Varieties of Capitalism’, 27 North Carolina Journal of International
Law and Commercial Regulation (2001) p. 255; Luke Nottage, ‘Nothing New in the NorthEast? Interpreting the Rhetoric and Reality of Japanese Corporate Governance’, 2 CLPE

Capitalism and the Learning Firm

471

firm’s managerial cohort, given that employee well-being and the preservation of
stable employment relations ranked high on the Japanese corporate governance
agenda. By comparison, in the United States, human resources have not been
considered a crucial or vital element of corporate governance. Human resources
managers regularly take second or third place after strategic and, more recently,
financial management personnel. The US model can probably best be understood
as a ‘market model’, while for the Japanese one the label ‘organisational model’
appears most suitable.5 There is certainly a whole host of elements and issues
connected with such a characterisation, and this should already indicate that any
such label hardly captures the complexity of how decisions are taken in and for
the business enterprise. Even less can such labels fully illustrate the wealth of
elements conducive to sustained economic success. It is here, where business
historians, economists and corporate governance scholars 6 have much to say to all
those who perhaps too quickly assume the triumph of a certain organisational
paradigm.7
As can be observed over the last fifteen years, the German co-determination
model and the Japanese human resources model have come under pressure. First
and foremost, global financial liquidity and the ever shorter periods over which a
company’s economic performance is being assessed seem to leave little room for
the long-term orientation that both German 8 and Japanese 9 firms have long been
endorsing. This development has been taken by many to reflect on a fundamental
.

.

.

——————————————————

Research Paper Series (2007), available at: <http://www.comparativeresearch.net>; William
Lazonick, ‘The Japanese Economy and Corporate Reform: What Path to Sustainable Prosperity?’, in William Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan, eds., Corporate Governance and Sustainable
Prosperity (London/Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan 2002) p. 226.
5 Ibid., at p. 11.
6 See, Mary O’Sullivan, Contests for Corporate Control: Corporate Governance and
Economic Performance in the United States and Germany (Oxford, Oxford University Press
2000); Mary O’Sullivan, ‘The innovative enterprise and corporate governance’, 24 Cambridge
Journal of Economics (2000) p. 393; Oliver E. Williamson, ‘The Modern Corporation: Origins,
Evolution, Attributes’, 19 J. Econ. Lit. (1981) p. 1537; William Lazonick, ‘Innovative
Enterprise and Historical Transformation’, 3 Enterprise & Society (2002) p. 3; Antoine
Rebérioux, ‘The end of history in corporate governance? A critical appraisal’, Amsterdam
Research Centre for Corporate Governance Regulation, Inaugural Workshop 17-18 December
2004, available at: <http://www.arccgor.nl/uploads/File/Reberioux%20Amsterdam%202.pdf>;
Friedrich Kübler, ‘A Shifting Paradigm of European Company Law?’, 11 Colum. J. Eur. L.
(2005) p. 219 at pp. 239-240: ‘But the complex rules and cumbersome and lengthy procedures
are the result of political compromises, which are very much shaped by the ideas and assumptions of the past; they show specific features of “path-dependence” and the stickiness of wellestablished institutional arrangements.’
7 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’, 89
Geo. L. J. (2001) p. 439.
8 Klaus J. Hopt, ‘Corporate Governance in Germany’, in Klaus J. Hopt and Eddy Wymeersch,
eds., Capital Markets and Company Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2003) p. 289.
9 Nottage (2001), loc. cit. n. 4.
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convergence of corporate governance regimes. To explore the validity and the
lessons from such a finding, we need to place these contentions in the context of
comparative assessments of legal structures and their larger institutional, political,
economic and cultural environment.
2.1

Le regard d’autrui: comparative perspectives on company law

The alleged convergence of corporate governance regimes around the world has
been on the mind of investors, policy-makers and scholars for some years now.10
In fact, whether such a convergence is actually taking place has at the same time
been contested by many participants in the debate.11 The trickiness of such
assessments of a moving target is certainly also felt by such a keen observer as
The Economist, which in a recent survey on ‘European Business’ swayed between
dismissal of the European way of doing things, on the one hand, and Europe’s
promise to pull through, on the other.12 Vice Chancellor Leo Strine, Jr. noted an
abundance of ‘tired features’ in the ‘so-called corporate governance debate.
‘Exaggeration is the norm; conversation the exception.’13
——————————————————

See, e.g., the contributions in Joseph A. McCahery, Piet Moerland, Theo Raaijmakers
and Luc Renneborg, eds., Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity
(Oxford, Oxford University Press 2002); Jeffrey N. Gordon and Mark J. Roe, eds., Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
2004). A recent publication laudably takes a more contextual approach and features a comprehensive section on regulatory structures, bureaucracy and administrative law: see Klaus J. Hopt,
Eddy Wymeersch, Hideki Kanda and Harald Baum, eds., Corporate Governance in Context:
Corporations, States and Markets in Europe, Japan and the US (Oxford, Oxford University
Press 2005).
11 See, e.g., Sigurt Vitols, ‘Varieties of Corporate Governance: Comparing Germany and
the UK’, in Peter E. Hall and David W. Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional
Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2001) p. 337; Sally
Wheeler, Corporations and the Third Way (Oxford, Hart 2002); Wolfgang Streeck, ‘German
Capitalism: Does it Exist? Can it Survive?’, in Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, eds.,
Political Economy of Modern Capitalism (London, SAGE 1997) p. 33; Ronald Dore, William
Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan, ‘Varieties of Capitalism in the Twentieth Century’, 15 Oxford
Review of Economic Policy (1999) p. 102. See also the contributions in Wolfgang Streeck and
Kozo Yamamura, eds., The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism (Ithaca, Cornell University Press
2001); and Kozo Yamamura and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., The End of Diversity? Prospects for
German and Japanese Capitalism (Ithaca, Cornell University Press 2003). Harald Baum,
‘Change of Governance in Historic Perspective: The German Experience’, in Hopt et al., op.
cit. n. 10, available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=695741>, observes that a ‘gradual and partial
de-bundling of the corporatist “Deutschland AG” appears to be somewhat probable.’ Ibid., at p.
21. See also Kübler, loc. cit. n. 6, at p. 239: ‘slow, piecemeal, cumbersome’ changes of corporate law structures in Europe.
12 ‘Who are the Champions?’, The Economist, 8 February 2007, available at: <http://www.
economist.com/surveys/displayStory.cfm?story_id=8621685>.
13 Leo E. Strine Jr., ‘Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance’,
10
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At the outset of any assessment of converging regulatory regimes should lie an
appreciation of what it is that is allegedly converging. In other words, we need to
be clear on what we mean by corporate governance and which aspects of it we
currently see changing. Secondly, we need to be mindful that identifying and
evaluating current developments necessitates a comparison of not only different
systems’ formal rules and codifications but also their customs and business
practices. In other words, we need to compare the law on the books and the law in
action. The latter, certainly in the area of corporate governance, constitutes a
wide-ranging variety of informal rules, standards, codes of conduct and understandings of relevant business communities. While these form an integral part of a
vibrant legal and economic environment, they are much harder to identify and
ascertain by an outside observer.
In this light, I would like to suggest that we attempt our comparison of existing corporate governance regimes through a combination of traditional modes of
comparative law, that is to say, its instruments, norms and their functionality, on
the one hand,14 and the political economy of corporate governance, in particular
the mix of formal and informal, of hard and soft laws, rules, standards and
practices, on the other.15 This combination will allow us to appreciate the real
changes that are taking place in different corporate law regimes around the world.
In addition, such a perspective will allow us to gain a deeper understanding of the
currently unfolding trends of convergence and divergence between corporate
governance regimes in regional markets and regulatory spaces such as the
European Union. Here, for example, the particular history of corporate law
harmonisation cannot be properly understood without such a ‘deeper reading’ of
the hard-soft forms of corporate law development that are characterising contemporary changes in the existing regulatory regimes.16 The European scene for
corporate law-making, then, is a remarkable laboratory for the study of multilevel
and multipolar law-making in a politically and culturally contested arena, where
different historically grown and embedded political economies are colliding.17
——————————————————

The Dorsey and Whitney Foundation Lecture, 10 March 2007, forthcoming in J. Corp. Law
(2007) p. 3, available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=989624>.
14 See only Ralf Michaels, ‘The Functional Method in Comparative Law’, in Mathias
Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann, eds., Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford,
Oxford University Press 2006) p. 339.
15 Peer Zumbansen, ‘Spaces and Places: A Systems Theory Approach to Regulatory Competition in European Company Law’, 12 Eur. L. J. (2006) p. 534, available at: <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=902695>.
16 Simon Deakin, ‘Reflexive Governance and European Company Law,’ CLPE Research
Paper Series (2007), available at: <http://www.comparativeresearch.net>; Peer Zumbansen,
‘The Parallel Worlds of Corporate Governance and Labor Law’, 13 Indiana Journal of Global
Studies (2006) p. 261, available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=902650>.
17 Martin Rhodes and Bastian van Apeldoorn, ‘Capital Unbound? The Transformation of
European Corporate Governance’, 5 Journal of European Public Policy (1998) p. 406; Vanessa
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What is corporate governance?

Confusion over the potential impact of the alleged convergence in different
corporate governance regimes is what lies at the heart of what we mean by
‘corporate governance’. The law of corporate governance, commonly conceived
as ‘company law’, ‘corporate law’ or ‘business associations’, is embedded in a
larger regulatory scene that also comprises fields such as securities regulation,
labour law, industrial relations and insolvency law. But these legal fields are
complemented by a set of institutions that structure the development and practice
of corporate governance. Building on the work of Karl Polanyi in the 1940s,18
economic sociologists focus on the ‘embeddedness’ of economic action and have
been providing a plethora of intriguing case studies and analysis 19 of the ‘institutional, cultural and social contexts’20 in which commercial transactions are
unfolding.21 In order to trace the particular characteristics of distinct national
systems of corporate governance, it is essential to cast light on the historical,
socio-economic and legal developments that have contributed to national variation. While there is an important body of literature underlining the relevance of
historical trajectories and the associated competitive advantages of national
differences (the so-called ‘varieties of capitalism’ school 22 ), there is a wide
agreement that these distinct national systems are under severe and growing
pressure towards convergence. The privatisation of public welfare systems and
.

.

.

——————————————————

Edwards, ‘The European Company – Essential Tool or Eviscerated Dream?’, 40 Common
Market Law Review (2003) p. 443; Peer Zumbansen, ‘European Corporate Law and National
Divergences: The Case of Takeover Law’, 3 Wash. U. Glob. Stud. L. Rev. (2004) p. 867.
18 Polanyi, op. cit. n. 1.
19 Among the most eminent contributions in this regard is Granovetter (1985), loc. cit. n. 1.
The Director of the Cologne-based Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Jens
Beckert, refers to that article as ‘the “founding manifesto” of the new economic sociology’. See
Beckert, op. cit. n. 1, at p. 6.
20 Beckert, op. cit. n. 1, at p. 16.
21 See Hartmut Berghoff, ‘Markterschließung und Risikomanagement’, 92 Vierteljahreschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte (2005) p. 141; Richard Whitley, ‘The Institutional
Structuring of Innovation Strategies: Business Systems, Firm Types and Patterns of Technological Change in Different Market Economies’, 21 Organization Studies (2000) p. 855;
William Lazonick, ‘Varieties of Capitalism and Innovative Enterprise’, 24 Comparative Social
Research (2007) p. 21.
22 Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice, ‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’, in
Hall and Soskice, op. cit. n. 11, at p. 1; David Soskice, ‘Divergent Production Regimes:
Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s’, in Herbert
Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks and John D. Stephens, eds., Continuity and Change in
Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1999) p. 101; Dore,
Lazonick and O’Sullivan, loc. cit. n. 11; Robert Boyer, ‘Coherence, Diversity, and the
Evolution of Capitalisms – The Institutional Complementarity Hypothesis’, 2 Evol. Inst. Econ.
Rev. (2005) p. 43 at pp. 45-47; see also Matthew Allen, ‘The varieties of capitalism paradigm:
not enough variety?’, 2 Socio-Economic Review (2004) p. 87.
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the increased tendency to base pension and retirement financing on the capital
market 23 have coincided with a worldwide competition for stock market investments.24 As a consequence, the capacity of traditional stakeholder-oriented
systems of corporate governance to provide the transparency and management
control that is necessary for success in the global competition for investments is
increasingly contested.25
Beyond the disputes over the merits of ‘shareholder primacy’, however, lies
the essential question: the nature of the business corporation itself.26 Beyond the
ongoing struggle between shareholder- and stakeholder-oriented concepts of
corporate governance 27 lies a wide field of research concerning the organisational
design of today’s corporation as a complex and innovative institution of social
learning.28 The involvement of workers within the firm is not an issue that can be
solely understood against the background of established and hotly contested
models of co-determination.29 Rather, the role of workers in the firm can itself be
.

.

——————————————————

23 Friedrich Kübler, ‘The Impact of Equity Markets on Business Organization: Some Comparative Observations Regarding Differences in the Evolution of Corporate Structures’, 2
EBOR (2001) p. 669; Friedrich Kübler, ‘The Rules of Capital Under Pressure of the Securities
Markets’, in Hopt and Wymeersch, op. cit. n. 8, at p. 95.
24 Theodor Baums, ‘Interview: Reforming German Corporate Governance: Inside a LawMaking Process of a Very New Nature’, 2 German Law Journal (2001), available at: <http://
www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues.php?id=43>; Theodor Baums, ‘Company Law Reform
in Germany’, 3 J. Corp. L. Stud. (2003) p. 181.
25 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘Toward a Single Model of Corporate Law?’,
in McCahery et al., op. cit. n. 10, at p. 56.
26 Simon Deakin, ‘Workers, Finance and Democracy’, in Catherine Barnard, Simon Deakin
and Gillian S. Morris, eds., The Future of Labour Law: Liber Amicorum Bob Hepple (Oxford,
Hart 2003) p. 79.
27 Richard Mitchell, Anthony O’Donnell and Ian Ramsay, ‘Shareholder Value and Employee Interests: Intersections between Corporate Governance, Corporate Law and Labour
Law’ (2005), available at: <http://cclsr.law.unimelb.edu.au/research-papers/Shareholder%20
value%20paper%20_23.06.05_.pdf>.
28 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, ‘Die Prozeduralisierung des Unternehmens’, in Dieter Hart, ed.,
Privatrecht im ‘Risikostaat’ (Baden-Baden, Nomos 1997) p. 137; Irene Lynch Fannon,
Working Within Two Kinds of Capitalism: Corporate Governance and Employee Stakeholding:
US and EC Perspectives (Oxford, Hart 2003); James E. Post, Lee E. Preston and Sybille Sachs,
Redefining the Corporation: Stakeholder Management and Organizational Wealth (Stanford,
Stanford Business Books 2002); Antoine Pirovano, ‘La “boussole” de la société. Intéret
commun, intéret social, intéret de l’entreprise’, Recueil Dalloz (1997) p. 189; Michel Crozier,
L’entreprise à l’écoute. Apprendre le management post-industriel (Paris, Interéditions 1989);
Peer Zumbansen, ‘The Conundrum of Corporate Social Responsibility: Remarks on the
Changing Nature of Firms and States’, in Rebecca M. Bratspies and Russell A. Miller, eds.,
Transboundary Harm: Lessons from the Trail Smelter Arbitration (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press 2006) p. 274; Lazonick, loc. cit. n. 21.
29 See, e.g., Jens Dammann, ‘The Future of Codetermination after Centros: Will German
Corporate Law Move Closer to the U.S. Model?’, 8 Fordham Journal of Corporate &
Financial Law (2003) p. 607; Anja Strüve, ‘Deutscher Juristentag 2006’, 1 Legal Latitudes
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explained only with regard to the ways in which the firm is organised to generate,
channel and process fragmented knowledge and innovative capacity.30 The
association of workers’ involvement with a firm’s social,31 intellectual and
innovative capital certainly differs from the hitherto held perception that workers’
involvement in corporate governance is merely an inefficient check on shareholder power. In fact, switching from a conflict model, which opposes
shareholders against employees, to one of cooperation and integration of viewpoints, capacities and processes opens up a new perspective on workers’
involvement. This perspective is directed at the productive input of workers’
knowledge for a more efficient governance of the firm.32 The latter differs from
the much-discussed and often not sufficiently understood form of codetermination as it exists, for example, in German supervisory boards.33 In these,
half of the board’s members are employee representatives. This has led many
observers to a harsh dismissal of this powerful influence of workers. The fact
remains, however, that the chairman of the supervisory board, usually a share——————————————————

(2007) p. 4 at p. 5, available at: <www.osgoode.yorku.ca/legallatitudes>. From the ongoing
vivid German discussion, see, for a conciliatory viewpoint, Thomas Raiser,
Unternehmensmitbestimmung vor dem Hintergrund europarechtlicher Entwicklungen.
Gutachten B zum 66. Deutschen Juristentag, Stuttgart 2006 (Munich, Beck 2006) pp. B 111116; Walter Bayer, ‘Auswirkungen der Niederlassungsfreiheit nach den EuGH-Entscheidungen
Inspire Art und Überseering auf die deutsche Unternehmensmitbestimmung’, 49 Die
Aktiengesellschaft (2004) p. 534 at pp. 537-538. In contrast, see Michael Adams, ‘Das Ende der
Mitbestimmung’, 27 Zeitschrift für Insolvenzpraxis (2006) p. 1561; Martin Hennsler,
‘Bewegung in der deutschen Mitbestimmungsdiskussion – Reformdruck durch
Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft’, Recht der Arbeit (2005) p. 330; and Eberhard Schwark,
‘Globalisierung, Europarecht und Unternehmensmitbestimmung im Konflikt’, 49 Die
Aktiengesellschaft (2004) p. 173. With a call not for abandonment but for reform from a
particular focus on the organisational structures within the company, on the one hand, and the
firm’s overall competitiveness based on business strategy and product quality, on the other:
Axel von Werder, ‘Überwachungseffizienz und Unternehmensmitbestimmung’, 49 Die
Aktiengesellschaft (2004) p. 166.
30 Antoine Rebérioux, ‘Les marchés financiers et la participation des salariés aux décisions’, 93 Travail et Emploi (2003) p. 25; Antoine Rebérioux, ‘European Style of Corporate
Governance at the Crossroads: The Role of Worker Involvement’, 40 Journal of Common
Market Studies (2002) p. 111; Whitley, loc. cit. n. 21, at p. 864.
31 See Ian Jones, Michael Pollitt and David Bek, ‘Multinationals in their Communities: A
Social Capital Approach to Corporate Citizenship Projects’ (2006), available at: <http://www.
cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP337.pdf>.
32 Ash Amin and Patrick Cohendet, Architectures of Knowledge: Firms, Capabilities and
Communities (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2004) p. 113: ‘The first and most obvious
“management” step implicit in a model of learning by doing is clear recognition of the limits of
management by design, of the top-down inculcation of creativity.’
33 For a concise presentation of the model, see only Katharina Pistor, ‘Codetermination: A
Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities’, in Margaret M. Blair and Mark J. Roe,
eds., Employees and Corporate Governance (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press
1999) p. 163.
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holder representative, holds the deciding vote. The confusion about the parity of
powers in the supervisory board is legendary. While the fact of the chairman’s
deciding vote alone should put overly troubled minds to rest about the purportedly
counterproductive effects of co-determined supervisory boards of large German
enterprises, even recent empirical evidence from German companies indeed
seems to suggest that many managers recognise benefits from the – still – existing
system.34
In contrast, the other form of co-determination, which has always existed in
the shadow of the internationally discussed and scrutinised board codetermination, concerns so-called works councils. These can be formed in all
companies with at least five employees, if at least three have been with the firm
for six months.
Works councils are constituted only by employees and are elected by secret
ballot. They are understood as being a counterpart to management and play a
crucial role in the firing process, seeking together with management to maintain
socially justifiable criteria when selecting personnel to be laid off. This form of
worker involvement, from an international perspective, has existed in a quiet,
neglected corner of the otherwise heated corporate governance debate. While the
law clearly attributes a relatively prominent role to works councils, their institutional success has been varied.35 Only recently, works councils have acquired a
more positively regarded currency. One of the reasons for this development was
the 1994 introduction of so-called European Works Councils.36 Their success has
been ambiguous at best, assessments ranging from doubts over unions pursuing
their local interests through the newly established EWCs 37 and critical evaluations
of the less-empowered EWCs when compared to the German Betriebsräte 38 to a
sceptical rejection of EWCs as yet another mosaic stone in an already losing
battle for organised labour interests.39 While these developments unfolded at the
European level, domestically works councils became increasingly entangled in
.

.
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34 Martin Höpner, ‘Mitbestimmungskritik hält Prüfung nicht stand’, 6 Mitbestimmung
(2004) pp. 54-57, available at: <http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/people/mh/paper/MB_62004.pdf>.
35 Manfred Weiss, ‘Labor Law’, in Joachim Zekoll and Mathias Reimann, eds., Introduction to German Law (The Hague, Kluwer Law International/Munich, Beck 2006) p. 299 at pp.
311-312.
36 Paul Marginson, Mark Hall, Aline Hoffmann and Torsten Müller, ‘The Impact of European Works Councils on Management Decision Making in UK and US-based Multinationals: A
Case Study Comparison’, 42 British Journal of Industrial Relations (2004) p. 209.
37 Bob Hancké, ‘European Works Councils and Industrial Restructuring in the European
Motor Industry’, 6 Eur. J. Ind. Rel. (2000) p. 35.
38 Wolfgang Streeck, ‘The Internationalization of Industrial Relations in Europe: Prospects
and Problems’, 26 Politics & Society (1998) p. 429.
39 Thorsten Schulten, ‘European Works Councils: Prospects for a New System of European
Industrial Relations’, 2 Eur. J. Ind. Rel. (1999) p. 303.
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pressure systems created by firm management, on the one hand, and trade unions,
on the other. While the latter eventually conceded so-called opening clauses that
would allow variations to the collective agreement to be stipulated at the firm
level, management has taken this opportunity in recent years to forcefully push
employees to enter into unfavourable agreements in exchange for, say, job
security. Effectively, works councils can now often be seen to accept agreements
that contain standards that are well below the threshold contained in collective
agreements. Trade unions themselves find themselves facing the dilemma that
their protest would potentially drive more of their already weakening members
away.40
Taking a step back from this labour interests perspective, however, we can
identify a set of other considerations relating to the works councils. Here, then,
another reason for the increased attention received by works councils can be seen
in the overwhelming pressure on firms to improve their competitiveness (inseparable from their organisational structure), the firms’ location and the applicable
laws governing salaries, production and social costs. In this context, works
councils are increasingly being recognised as essential fora for the much-needed
negotiation between management and employees in developing and realising the
most cost-effective solutions for the firm’s future.41 A crucial aspect, then, is that,
at the same time as the influence of trade unions is diminishing, works councils
might be seen as enforcing their own demise instead of being able to work against
it. In this light, works councils can be seen to be entering a pact with the devil.
Where agreements between management and employees that are pursued as part
of industrial restructuring strategies on the part of management in highly competitive industries can be reached at the level of the firm,42 the larger framework of
workers’ representation in a coordinated market becomes economy questionable.
In reality, management can exercise a large degree of pressure on works councils
by connecting demands on lower wages, longer working hours and so on with
threats of relocation, plant closure and the like – all that in exchange for job
security, for the time being.43
This problematic interaction between management and works councils certainly does not invite a very optimistic view on management-employee relations.
To be sure, it is not the fact that there is such interaction that is problematic but
the reduction of the works council to a transmission belt that communicates the
management’s will to the employee constituency. In this scenario, chances might
remain unused for a resource-based, fruitful and sustained collaboration between
the different power levels within the corporation.
——————————————————

Weiss, loc. cit. n. 35, at p. 319.
Joel Rogers and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Works Councils: Consultation, Representation,
and Cooperation in Industrial Relations (London, University of Chicago Press 1996).
42 Hancké, loc. cit. n. 37, at p. 39.
43 Weiss, loc. cit. n. 35, at p. 319.
40
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This last aspect is important. As indicated, there is a second reason for the
recent interest in works councils. In fact, this reason provides a much more
positive perspective on the interaction among the different powers within the
firm. Organisational science scholars and management theorists have been
emphasising the economic gains that can result from close cooperation between
management and the firm’s work force. The value of workers’ input in refining,
strengthening and consolidating the firm’s performance is increasingly recognised
in traditionally organised firms and to a certain degree also in more loosely
organised, unbundled or networked firms. The latter has been described by
organisation and labour scholars as the final deadly blow delivered to workers’
rights, given that organising becomes more difficult as the firm becomes more
decentralised, as the organisational structure becomes more opaque and employment relations become more precarious. The combination of corporate
organisation in the twenty-first century firm and the flexibilisation of work
constitutes the dark side of the culture of the new capitalism.44 At the same time,
the very volatility of corporate organisation in a networked economy must not
necessarily lead only to a further erosion of workers’ power within a firm. More
sophisticated studies by management and organisation theorists show that
management in many cases relies on a healthy and functioning relationship with
the firm’s employees, especially where high profile and fast-changing organisational patterns require capacities of adaptation and responsiveness.45
As an interim observation, we can say that co-determination exists in two
forms, one involving quasi-parity of shareholder and employee representatives on
the supervisory board of large stock corporations and the other one involving
works councils in small to large firms. The first form has regularly attracted a lot
of international attention and has recently attracted strong criticism as constituting
a so-called ‘competitive disadvantage’ in the global race for investment. And yet,
a closer look at the voting structures of the board, together with the deliberation
practices long followed by corporate actors in Germany, reveals – as we saw
above – the myth behind the much-discussed German social model, of which codetermination has always been seen as a central pillar.46 The latter model, located
in works councils, has only more recently stepped forward to play a remarkably
differentiated role. On the one hand, works councils have become the site for the
implementation of management policy concerning restructuring, plant relocation
and closing. On the other, works councils could come to be seen as potentially
important players in tapping, structuring and realising knowledge and capacity
pools that exist within the firm. The latter, more positive perspective on workers’
——————————————————
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Richard Sennett, The Culture of the New Capitalism (New Haven, Yale University Press

2006).
45
46

Jones, Pollitt and Bek, loc. cit. n. 31.
Streeck, loc. cit. n. 11, at p. 37.
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involvement in the firm provides a friendly contrast to the before-mentioned
development.
3.

THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL: SPACES AND PLACES OF CONVERGENCE
AND DIVERGENCE

The following section will place these observations into the context of the contemporary corporate law-making environment in the European Union and Germany (in
particular with a view to complementing official rules with unofficial ones such as
soft norms, recommendations and codes of conduct). Before this, however, it is
necessary to allude briefly to the larger conceptual framework in which these
developments have been taking place. Today, contemporary global developments
demand the attention of domestic law reformers in the areas of corporate law and
securities regulation. There are different ways, in which national governments or, in
the case of the European Union, regional lawmakers, have been reacting to international developments. The post-Cold War opening of formerly closed markets, along
with the large-scale restructuring of publicly financed services and infrastructures
and their replacement by privatisation and deregulation, has fundamentally altered
the playing field for business corporations, investors and interest groups, as well as
for domestic and transnational regulators.
Table 1: The End(s) of History
END OF HISTORY I
Francis Fukuyama (1992): End of History
Michel Albert (1991): Capitalisme contra Capitalisme
END OF HISTORY II
Hall/Soskice (2001): Varieties of Capitalism
Hansmann/Kraakman (2001): End of History in Corporate Law

To trace how these global developments translate in a domestic and a regional
context, the following subsection will take a closer look at both the EU company
law scene and the corporate law reform process currently taking place in Germany.
3.1

Germany’s company law reform and changing regulatory
landscapes

The 1980s and 1990s in Germany were a period of difficult bargaining between a
pro-shareholder government and deeply entrenched stakeholders, unions and
lobby groups. With the end of Social Democratic government in 1982, the
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Christian Democratic/Liberal majority took power in 1983. In 1998, at the end of
Christian Democratic rule, the first major corporate law reform legislation since
the 1960s was finally adopted. The Law on Corporate Control and Transparency
(KonTraG ) introduced a number of elements designed to improve German
corporate governance, long criticised for its less developed disclosure rules and,
importantly, for its already mentioned two-tier board, in which worker representatives have half the seats on the supervisory board – but as we have seen – not half
the votes, as the chairman, a shareholder representative, has the deciding vote.
The KonTraG left this structure untouched, as well as the high number of seats
on the supervisory board, and thereby failed to satisfy longstanding demands to
change the German system and make the supervisory board more effective.47 The
German debate concerning the reform of the supervisory board has not lost in
intensity and has indeed received renewed input from a combination of forces
both at the domestic and the transnational and European level.
Domestic corporate law reform discussions such as those in Germany 48 or in
other countries 49 are taking place in the light of a European and global debate
over competition for mobile capital and how corporate law systems might
accommodate companies’ needs to tap into these capital markets without boundaries.50 At the same time, the debate is taking place against the background of a
complex European integration process in which the political and cultural outcome
remains unsettled.51
.

.

.
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47 For an excellent discussion of these changes, see only John W. Cioffi, ‘Restructuring
“Germany Inc.”: The Politics of Corporate Governance Reform in Germany and the European
Union’, 24 Law & Policy (2002) p. 355; John W. Cioffi, ‘Corporate Governance Reform,
Regulatory Politics, and the Foundations of Finance Capitalism in the United States and
Germany’, 7 German L. J. (2006) p. 533.
48 See, e.g., Baums (2003), loc. cit. n. 24; Ulrich Seibert, ‘The Company Law Reform
Projects of the German Ministry of Justice’, 69 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und
internationales Privatrecht (2005) p. 712; Ulrich Noack and Dirk Zetzsche, ‘Corporate
Governance in Germany: The Second Decade’, Center for Business and Corporate Law (CBC)
Research Paper Series (2005).
49 Guido Ferrarini, Paolo Guidici and Maria Stella Richter, ‘Company Law Reform in
Italy: Real Progress?’, 69 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht
(2005) p. 658; Eilís Ferran, ‘The Company Law Reform in the United Kingdom: A Progress
Report’, ibid., pp. 629-657; Michel Menjucq, ‘The Company Law Reform in France’, ibid., pp.
698-711; Claude Champaud and Didier Danet, ‘NRE’, Revue trimestrielle de droit commercial
et de droit économique (2002) p. 17.
50 See the contributions in Steven Weber, ed., Globalization and the European Political
Economy (New York, Columbia University Press 2001).
51 Joseph H.H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, 100 Yale L. J. (1991) p. 2403;
Fritz W. Scharpf, Governing Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford, Oxford University
Press 1999); Christian Joerges, ‘The Law’s Problems with the Governance of the European
Market’, in Christian Joerges and Renaud Dehousse, eds., Good Governance in Europe’s
Integrated Market (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2002) p. 3; Christoph Möllers, ‘European
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It is obvious that, within the European Union, the varieties of capitalism approach is of great significance, for it explicitly addresses the embedded,
historically grown socio-political and cultural systems of the Member States.52
How difficult it would be to achieve any harmonisation of company law standards
in Europe given the high degree of diversity of existing company law regimes
was strongly evidenced by the decades-long struggle over the European Company, originally initiated as early as the 1970s and adopted after many
compromises in 2001.53 Another example of the European varieties of capitalism
in the field is the almost fifteen-year-long fight over a European Takeover
Directive. This was concluded only in 2004, resulting in a directive that contains
so many opt-out clauses, that the question has been asked whether it has led to
any harmonisation at all.54
International attention is usually attracted by the noise that surrounds the larger developments, such as European directives or the corporate governance
standards promulgated by international bodies such as the OECD (Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development) or by domestic legislators (such as
the US Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002). Less attention is focused on the dramatically
more complex forms of law reform that take place at other levels and are not so
easily discernable by the outside spectator. Examples of such reforms can be
found within the myriad ways in which Member States move to implement
European law into their domestic legal orders. While there are straightforward
and easy ways to track reforms, as for example when a Member State passes a
law that appears to translate a European directive into its domestic legal framework, in reality such law-making processes take very different forms within hotly
contested fields. In short, they take place in many unofficial, harder to trace ways,
as the landscape of norm making in corporate law (as in many other areas) has
been changing dramatically. The emergence of privately made best practice
guidelines, codes of conduct and corporate governance codes has led to a farreaching change of the relevant regulatory landscape in which companies operate
today.55 But many of its features and elements are not – and arguably cannot – be
——————————————————

Governance: Meaning and Value of a Concept’, 43 Common Market Law Review (2006) p.
313.
52 Hall and Soskice, op. cit. n. 11.
53 Erik Werlauff, ‘The SE Company – A New Common European Company from 8 October 2004’, 14 European Business Law Review (2003) p. 85; Christoph Teichmann, ‘The
European Company – A Challenge to Academics, Legislatures and Practitioners’, 4 German L.
J. (2003) p. 309.
54 Christian Kirchner and Richard W. Painter, ‘Takeover Defenses under Delaware Law,
the Proposed Thirteenth EU Directive and the New German Takeover Law: Comparison and
Recommendations for Reform’, 50 American Journal of Comparative Law (2002) p. 451;
Zumbansen, loc. cit. n. 17.
55 Ben Pettet, ‘Combined Code: A Firm Place for Self-Regulation in Corporate Governance’, 13 Journal of International Banking Law (1998) p. 394; Baums (2001), loc. cit. n. 24;
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truthfully represented and documented in the official legislation. The proliferation
of private, semi-public and quasi-public lawmakers in the fields of corporate and
securities law has altered the regulatory landscape so that it has become much
harder to develop a political critique of the processes as they unfold. In corporate
law, this is expressed by corporate governance codes and best practice recommendations, as it is in the case of labour law by codes of conduct, which purport
to provide for a comprehensive regulation of employment relationships.56 To be
sure, the shift away from traditional forms of law-making and the embrace of
myriad ways of norm creation (often summarised as ‘governance’) has had as one
of its consequences the highly problematic removal of many regulatory changes
from the political debate. In many cases, ‘demands’ of the market are offered as
sufficient justifications for legal change, effectively moving it outside of the
political arena of deliberation and contestation.
Illustrating this point are the deep-reaching changes to that element of German
corporate governance that seems to be at the core of the ‘end of history’ critique
of Germany’s need for reform, on the one hand, and of Mark Roe’s characterisation of ‘social democratic’ corporate governance, on the other.57 The here found
depiction of the allegedly social democratic origins, nature and preservation of
workers’ co-determination on company boards may, however, blind our view to
the much more nuanced, ambiguous and multi-directional lines along which
corporate governance has been evolving.
Indeed, one of the most discussed features of German company law – codetermination – has been attracting scathing criticism from the press, both from
lobbyists who fear the negative signal co-determination sends to prospective and
much needed international investors and from scholars.58 Even the national
lawyers’ meeting in the autumn of 2006 put co-determination on the agenda and
——————————————————

Peer Zumbansen, ‘The Privatization of Corporate Law? Corporate Governance Codes and
Commercial Self-Regulation’, Juridikum (2002) p. 136; Johannes Köndgen, ‘Privatisierung des
Rechts. Private Governance zwischen Deregulierung und Rekonstitutionalisierung’, 206 AcP
(2006) p. 477.
56 For a critique, see Harry W. Arthurs, ‘Private Ordering and Workers’ Rights in the
Global Economy: Corporate Codes of Conduct as a Regime of Labour Market Regulation’, in
Joanne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl and Karl Klare, eds., Labour Law in an Era of
Globalization. Transformative Practices and Possibilities (Oxford, Oxford University Press
2002) p. 471; Adelle Blackett, ‘Codes of Corporate Conduct and the Labour Law Regulatory
State in Developing Countries’, in John J. Kirton and Michael J. Trebilcock, eds., Hard
Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environment and Social Governance
(Aldershot, Ashgate 2004) p. 121; Zumbansen, loc. cit. n. 16.
57 Roe, loc. cit. n. 4; Mark J. Roe, ‘German Co-Determination and German Securities
Markets’, in Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mark J. Roe, Eddy Wymeersch and Stefan Prigge,
eds., Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research
(Oxford, Clarendon Press 1998) p. 361; Mark J. Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate
Governance (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2003).
58 See references supra n. 21.
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openly explored its possible demise.59 These developments strongly suggest that
even in Germany, one of the heartlands of Michel Albert’s Rhenish capitalism,60
there is a shift towards a more shareholder-driven corporate governance regime.61
However, what the bird’s eye view of the observer fails to capture is the altogether ambivalent process – both politically and institutionally – that characterises
German company law reform. Here, the point is that the legal reform agenda is
driven by an intricate and, for German traditions, seemingly unprecedented
combination of official and unofficial law-making.62 The currently pursued
reform agenda is the result of federal law-making and the work of an expert
commission that was initiated by the government in 2000.63 That commission
resulted in the issuance of detailed marching orders, recommendations and
demands for the legislator as to how to adapt the German company law system to
the ‘needs of global financial markets’.64 On the other hand, the commission also
suggested the creation of a follow-on commission to draft a code of best practices,
the so-called German Corporate Governance Code.65 An early discussion regarding the Code’s legal nature quietly subsided.66 A comprehensive law reform in
——————————————————

See Strüve, loc. cit. n. 29, at p. 5.
Michel Albert, Capitalisme contre Capitalisme (Paris, Editions du Seuil 1991).
61 See Cioffi (2006), loc. cit. n. 47.
62 See the increasing number of scholarly assessments of this process: Peter Hommelhoff
and Martin Schwab, ‘Staats-ersetzende Privatgremien im Unternehmensrecht’, in Walter
Drenseck and Roman Seer, eds., Festschrift für Heinrich Wilhelm Kruse zum 70. Geburtstag
(Cologne, Schmidt 2001) p. 693; Stefan Berg and Mathias Stöcker, ‘Anwendungs- und
Haftungsfragen zum Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex’, 56 Wertpapiermitteilungen
(2002) p. 1569; Marcus Lutter, ‘Die Kontrolle der gesellschaftsrechtlichen Organe: Corporate
Governance – ein internationales Thema’, 24 Jura (2002) p. 83; Christoph H. Seibt, ‘Deutscher
Corporate Governance Kodex und Entsprechenserklärung (§ 161 AktG-E)’, 47 Die
Aktiengesellschaft (2002) p. 249; Gregor Bachmann, ‘Der “Deutsche Corporate Governance
Kodex”: Rechtswirkungen und Haftungsrisiken’, Wertpapiermitteilungen (2002) p. 2137;
Georg Borges, ‘Selbstregulierung im Gesellschaftsrecht – zur Bindung an Corporate
Governance-Kodices’, 32 ZGR (2003) p. 508.
63 Baums (2001), loc. cit. n. 24; Zumbansen, loc. cit. n. 55.
64 Theodor Baums, ed., Bericht der Regierungskommission Corporate Governance.
Unternehmensführung, Unternehmenskontrolle, Modernisierung des Aktienrechts (Cologne,
Otto Schmidt 2001).
65 Gerhard Cromme (Chairman), German Corporate Governance Code, drafted by the
German Corporate Governance Commission, Berlin, 26 February 2002, available at: <http://
www.corporate-governance-code.de/eng/download/CorGov_Endfassung_E.pdf>.
66 Martin Wolf, ‘Corporate Governance. Der Import angelsächsicher “Self-Regulation” im
Widerstreit zum deutschen Parlamentsvorbehalt’, 35 Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik (2002) p. 59;
Paul Kirchhof, ‘Demokratie ohne parlamentarische Gesetzgebung?’, 54 Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift (2001) p. 1332; Wolfgang Seidel, ‘Kodex ohne Rechtsgrundlage’, Neue
Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht ( NZG) (2004) p. 1095; Markus Heintzen, ‘Der Deutsche
Corporate Governance Kodex aus der Sicht des deutschen Verfassungsrechts’, 25 Zeitschrift
für Wirtschaftsrecht (2004) p. 1933; Henrik-Michael Ringleb, Thomas Kremer, Marcus Lutter
and Axel von Werder, Kommentar zum Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex (Kodex59
60
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corporate law, which was initiated by the Social Democratic government at the
time, seems to turn the dearly held cliché of Germany’s stakeholder capitalism
company law regime on its head. The first and the second commissions, in
preparing the legislative design and the collection of best practice guidelines,
ingeniously managed to adopt allegedly universal models and terms through
which they prepared the field for the major overhaul. But while everybody
expected that this would mean the abolition of co-determination, change occurred
in much more subtle, but clearly no less dramatic ways. The government did not
openly attack co-determination, while the semi-political, quasi-public expert body
– the commission – silently and effectively worked towards its deconstruction.
Certainly, the recommendations pertaining to the isolation of the inter-shareholder
dialogue from that of the stakeholders (the employees and union representatives)67
must be seen within the context of the post-Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art
fallout within the European company law scene.68 That scene, as regards the
disembedded operationability of the incorporation theory for European companies
seeing a dramatic increase in the mobility increase of companies, is still in search
of the best legislative fix.69
This change in the German approach, which has led to a larger role for unofficial, indirect forms of law-making,70 has important lessons to offer for our current
and future appreciation of the European company law scene. It is here where we
would still harbour hopes as to the preservation not only of difference with regard
to the long-standing legal and socio-economic cultures in the Member States but
also with regard to the preservation of an open eye for the forms in which law
reform has been taking place in recent years across the globe.
3.2

The ‘European company law scene’: overcoming diversity?

The current European company law scene is characterised by an interesting
tension between different trends and dynamics. When European scholars assessed
the prospects of company law in Europe a couple of decades ago, no one doubted
——————————————————

Kommentar), 2nd edn. (Munich, Beck 2005) pp. 27-30: arguing that both the Baums Commission and the legislator intended the core of the Code to consist of non-binding
recommendations for which no statutory authorisation would be necessary.
67 See section 3.6 of the German Corporate Governance Code, available at: <http://www.
corporate-governance-code.de/eng/download/E_CorGov_Endfassung_June_2006_highlighted.pdf>.
68 Christian Kersting and Clemens Christian Schindler, ‘The ECJ’s Inspire Art Decision of
30 September 2003 and Its Effects on Practice’, 4 German Law Journal (2003) p. 1277.
69 Dammann, loc. cit. n. 29.
70 The Code’s recommendation in section 3.6, see supra n. 67, has already found followers.
See, for example, the 2006 Corporate Governance Report from the METROGROUP, available
at: <http://www.metrogroup.de/servlet/PB/show/1119290/GB2006-Corporate-Governance-Berichtde.pdf>, which states explicitly that the Group has endorsed the Code’s recommendation to
prepare meetings of the supervisory board separately among the shareholder representatives.
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its centrality in the making of a more integrated market, both economically and
politically.71 A few decades down the road, the picture looks much different.
What began with high hopes for harmonised and unified corporate law rules
among the EC Member States eventually resulted in a series of increasingly long
and exhausting law-making initiatives, the success of which in many cases
depended on or was prevented by national resistance politics. While the European
legislator made considerably little progress in the area of company law,72 this was
not the case for capital markets law, where various regulations came out of
Brussels. With regard to the diversity of company laws in Europe, this was for a
long time and, indeed, until very recently seen as a particular feature and characteristic aspect of the European company law scene. While it made consensus
finding difficult in areas where change was recognised as being desirable, these
obstacles made everyone sensitive to the existing variations in corporate law
regimes and culture. The latter was always taken with a grain of salt among
Europeans: while it reflected on the diversity within Europe, it was also seen as a
problem with regard to corporate mobility in Europe and the attractiveness of
European firms for international investors.
This diversity has recently come to be seen in a different light. Reform attempts in recent years have regularly included eloquent references – and
reverences – to the existing diversity. At the same time, a number of developments suggest that the time for diversity might have come. For one, the
Commission has taken several steps toward reinvigorating law reform in this area.
These have grown out of the lengthy adoption process for two recent company
law directives, one concerning corporate takeovers and the other one to the
creation of a European Company Statute.73 Both were examples of drawn-out,
tiresome and complex negotiation struggles, one of which occupied lawmakers
for some thirty years, while the other one occupied almost half of that. In gearing
up for a safe adoption of the Takeover Directive, the Commission initiated an
expert committee process out of which grew, in quick succession, two of the first
comprehensive reports on the law relating to takeovers and the state of European
company law in general.74 These reports did not remain alone for long. At both
the European and the Member State level, we are seeing a plethora of committee
——————————————————

71 Clive Schmitthoff, ‘The Future of the European Company Law Scene’, in Clive Schmitthoff, ed., The Harmonisation of European Company Law (London, The United Kingdom
National Committee of Comparative Law 1973) p. 3.
72 Charlotte Villiers, European Company Law: Towards Democracy? (Aldershot, Ashgate/Dartmouth 1998).
73 Teichmann, loc. cit. n. 53, available at: <http://www.germanlawjournal.com>.
74 The so-called ‘Winter Reports I and II’, named after their chairman, Dutch law professor
Jaap Winter. See also Frits Bolkestein, ‘The Takeover Directive: A Commission Perspective
Address’, Speech at the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels 4 March 2003; Silja Maul
and Athanasios Kouloridas, ‘The Takeover Bids Directive’, 5 German Law Journal (2004) p.
355.
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reports, expert findings, recommendations and self-regulatory codes. For the
Commission, this has lead to a certain differentiation of its law-making agenda
and methodology. Realising the political obstacles that stand in the way of
harmonisation in specific core areas (e.g., board composition), the turn to soft
law, benchmarking and self-regulation promises a viable alternative.
However, there is another development that has a great impact on the shaping
of the European company law scene. The already mentioned case law of the ECJ
has dramatically altered the framework within which European managers are
thinking about where to incorporate. The Court’s rejection of national governments’ attempts at preventing foreign European companies form forming
subsidiaries in another European state has also put Member State lawmakers
under increased pressure to revisit their existing company law regimes. Hence,
following the case law in Centros (1999), Überseering (2002) and Inspire Art
(2003), national governments throughout Europe have begun to make farreaching changes to their applicable company law rules to render their legal
frameworks attractive under incorporation considerations.75
It is against this two-fold background that we have to assess the current European company law scene. The debate concerning the degree to which the ECJ’s
case law might have initiated a US-style process of regulatory competition is still
ongoing.76 At the same time, the shape and structure of company law in Europe
seems to be driven to a large extent by the already mentioned myriad forms of
soft law and indirect regulation that have come to the fore in recent years.77
Suffice it to point to the multi-level nature of these processes at the EU and the
domestic Member State level to show how this levelled structure is eventually
much more complicated, due to the fact that the relevant norms grow out of
reports, codes and other forms of soft law. This makes a straightforward assessment of the changes in the law dependent on the changes on the ground. In other
words, without a better view of how codes are implemented, how firms are
——————————————————

75 Kilian Bälz and Teresa Baldwin, ‘The End of the Real Seat Theory (Sitztheorie): The
European Court of Justice Decision in Ueberseering of 5 November 2002 and its Impact on
German and European Company Law’, 3 German Law Journal (2002), available at: <http://
www.germanlawjournal.com/current_issue.php?id=214>.
76 David Charny, ‘Competition among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Rules: An
American Perspective on the “Race to the Bottom” in the European Communities’, 32 Harvard
International Law Journal (1991) p. 423; Klaus Heine and Wolfgang Kerber, ‘European
Corporate Laws, Regulatory Competition and Path Dependence’, 13 European Journal of Law
and Economics (2002) p. 47; Stefano Lombardo, Regulatory Competition in Company Law in
the European Community: Prerequisites and Limits (Frankfurt am Main, Lang 2002); Simon
Deakin, ‘Two Types of Regulatory Competition: Competitive Federalism versus Reflexive
Harmonisation. A Law and Economics Perspective on Centros’, 2 Cambridge Yearbook of
European Legal Studies (1999) p. 231; Zumbansen, loc. cit. n. 15.
77 For an excellent analysis, see Anna di Robilant, ‘Genealogies of Soft Law’, 54 Am. J.
Comp. L. (2006) p. 499.
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actually responding to various suggestions of indirect and voluntary regulation,
there can hardly be a satisfying evaluation of the changing company law scene.78
What really matters in this respect, however, is that without a proper assessment
of the changes ‘on the ground’ we will fail to appreciate how these many soft and
indirect forms of norm-making, and the many ways in which companies have
been marketing their commitment to specific corporate governance or corporate
social responsibility standards, are reflective of an important shift in law-making.
While the noted cases of national resistance to company law harmonisation
put the political nature of corporate law in the spotlight, this space is rather dimly
lit when it comes to soft law and self-regulation. Ironically, these norms are
regularly not presented as law at all, because they do not have their origin in the
state nor are they equipped with the traditional enforcement instruments that we
know from state-made laws. Given their apparent distance from the state – and
their proximity to the market – soft laws are understood as private norms without
any real footing in the political sphere of the state’s law-making arena.79 It is this
removal of indirect corporate law regulation from the political sphere that
provokes the question whose interests are really served in the long run in this
scenario. Given that a certain lobbying group succeeds in dominating the market
for ideas with a certain concept for a while, what happens if the market begins to
shift? Not only does the formerly successful concept allegedly lose the support of
other market actors, but dependent personnel, employees, creditors and others
involved with the firm might also suffer from a change in corporate organisation.
We might just think this a natural effect of market actors’ self-regulation and
accept them as collateral. We might also, however, stop to think whether selfregulation can adequately capture and channel all of the involved stakeholders’
concerns in the different features of the firm’s organisation and governance. In
other words, where we pursue corporate law reform and realise the need to
overcome political deadlock that arises from path dependent, deeply embedded,
politically, legally and culturally backed regulatory regimes, we would be well
advised not to dismiss these features of embeddedness and the role of the law in
this context.
What should be seen as the most pressing of challenges in this regard is how
to reconnect our ongoing assessment of the fast changing and continuously
evolving modes of transnational governance, in the European Union 80 and
generally,81 with a critical inquiry into national law-making trajectories and the
.
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78 See, e.g., Eddy Wymeersch, ‘Enforcement of Corporate Governance Codes’, ECGI Law
Working Paper No. 46/2005 (2005).
79 Di Robilant, loc. cit. n. 77; see also Daniela Caruso, ‘Private Law and State-Making in
the Age of Globalization’, 39 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. (2006) p. 1.
80 See the excellent analysis by Möllers, loc. cit. n. 51.
81 See e.g., Craig Scott and Robert Wai, ‘Transnational Governance of Corporate Conduct
through the Migration of Human Rights Norms: The Potential of Transnational “Private”
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justifications offered in their support. One of the institutions engaged in a
complex, interwoven process of negotiation facilitation and promotion of best
practices is the European Corporate Governance Forum,82 established in pursuance to a recommendation of the Winter II Group in their November 2002 report
on European Company Law.83 The expert commission made it clear that such a
structure, while facilitating a process and eventual results that would themselves
be ‘voluntary and non-binding’, would be necessary in order to effectively work
towards an improvement of corporate governance regimes.84 In fact, what we can
observe to be arising from the European Corporate Governance Forum’s work in
recent times is a far-reaching collection of policy recommendations and lawmaking proposals that are portrayed as resulting from a quasi-natural process of
almost technical content.85 ‘Good corporate governance’ has emerged as the
regularly used formula to express the plethora of considerations that have
informed the deliberations among the forum’s members. In the light of the
alluded-to contestations of a convergence of corporate governance regimes and
the ongoing explorations into the different elements of corporate governance, we
are asked to further assess the merits of regulatory competition 86 and the apparent
triumph of a finance perspective on the corporation.87 To be sure, ‘good (corporate) governance’ results from an intricate and complex process of ongoing
political contestation and organisational experimentation. The latter is driven by
economic competition and stakeholder dynamics that have begun to surpass the
post-war paradigm of ‘industrial pluralism’ to include today a much wider and
more differentiated wealth of societal rationalities. The corporation of the twentyfirst century can only be inadequately captured through the polarity of shareholder and stakeholder interests. Instead, as both constituencies are transforming,
our description of the firm itself must change. Elements of change include the
assumption by corporations of large-scale public functions with regard to old-age
.
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pensions and public service delivery, the far-reaching alteration of corporate
ownership structures and, finally, the degree to which firms become ever-more
versatile and flexible organisations within a transnational knowledge economy.
The concluding section will now explore these perspectives in more detail.
4.

THE LEARNING FIRM

4.1

The transnational regulatory challenges of corporate governance
reform

This paper began by taking a perspective on the role of the employee in the firm.
This focus has helped to illustrate the current regulatory framework for workers’
involvement in firm management. Moreover, a study of contemporary developments in corporate governance has revealed that a discussion of co-determination
forms but a part of a much larger reflection process on corporate governance
rules. While there has been a long-standing debate as to the substantive goals of
corporate law regulation,88 this discussion has been rendered intricately more
complex due in part to the fact that the perspectives on corporate law have been
multiplied, enriched and widespread, making corporate law the ‘hottest game in
town’.89 Another reason why corporate law is increasingly recognised as a very
promising field in terms of research and reform potential 90 also has to do with the
field’s fascinating and challenging regulatory dimensions. The proliferation of
law-making arenas in the area of corporate law at the domestic, transnational and
international level constitutes a prime challenge to traditional understandings of
domestic bodies of corporate law with an occasional comparative glance to the
right or the left of one’s borders. Instead, corporate law has advanced to being one
of the most highly researched fields in terms of doctrinal, comparative, economic,
organisational, historical and political approaches.91 Before long, the immense
impact of these changes will be noticed and translated into core corporate law
curricula as well. The changing forms of law-making and the ensuing multijurisdictional competition between official and unofficial, soft and hard norms in
corporate regulation constitute a formidably complex landscape, the exploration
of which has only just begun.
.
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88 See, e.g., William W. Bratton, ‘Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn’,
26 Journal of Corporation Law (2001) p. 737.
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90 Horst Eidenmüller, ‘Forschungsperspektiven im Unternehmensrecht’, 62 Juristenzeitung
(2007) p. 487.
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The focus on management and employees, however, was taken to open the
door to an analysis of the corporation that would not limit its inquiry to traditional
elements of monitoring management, even if that included occasional assessments, for example, of the German two-tier board and worker co-determination in
supervisory boards.92 Instead, the moving of employees into the present corporate
governance spotlight was aimed at eventually gaining a better picture of what
constitutes ‘good’ corporate governance on the organisational level. It is this
level, which is often neglected in corporate law scholarship, that remains for the
most part within a rights paradigm of the corporation.93 While the combination of
structural analysis of the assigned rights of those invested in the corporation with
a particular view on the economic results of a particular regime has the advantage
of illuminating the tensions among different economic interests within and around
the corporation,94 it appears to fall short of capturing the processes and institutional dimensions of the firm in operation.95
4.2

Beyond the shareholder v. stakeholder divide:
the Strine-Bainbridge debate of 2007

Without a better understanding of the processes within the firm that result from an
institutional interaction within and outside the firm’s boundaries, it is hard to
imagine one would ever be in a position to make reasonable assessments about
the connection between corporate governance and economic performance. The
picture changes, however, if the concept of corporate governance is redefined by
drawing on the wider institutional perspective alluded to before. Where varieties
of capitalism scholars have importantly advanced our understanding of the market
structures that are conducive to and interacting with particular governance
strategies and structures, this perspective must be complemented in two ways.
One is the integration of a regulatory theory approach to the understanding of
corporate governance developments. Given the proliferation of norm producers,
localities and spheres for corporate rule-making, any assessment of corporate
governance developments must take this regulatory dimension into account.
——————————————————

92 Detlev Vagts, ‘Reforming the “Modern” Corporation: Perspectives from the German’,
80 Harvard L. Rev. (1966) p. 23.
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The second complementing perspective is directed at the structures of the
corporation itself. The two models that we have learned to identify as being
situated at opposite ends of the spectrum are the nexus-of-contracts conception of
the corporation,96 on the one hand, and the corporation as a social/political/
organic entity,97 on the other. A recent articulation of the corporation as a ‘social
institution’ was provided by Vice Chancellor Leo Strine, Jr., who argued that
both management and labour are likely to view a public corporation as something more than a nexus of contracts, as more akin to a social institution that,
albeit having the ultimate goal of producing profits for stockholders, also
durably serves and exemplifies other societal values. In particular, both management and labor recoil at the notion that a corporation’s worth can be
summed up entirely by the current price the equity markets place on its stock,
much less that the immediate demands of the stock market should thwart the
long-term pursuit of corporate growth.98

An intimate expert of US corporate governance politics with an ear close to the
ground, Strine aptly identifies the blind spots in the reigning and raging ‘corporate governance industry’ made up of ‘public pension fund administrators, proxy
advisory and corporate governance ratings organisations, corporate law scholars,
and business journalists’.99 Strine directs his critique at the heart of the dominant
school of thought, which contends that the Berle and Means challenge of overcoming the separation of ownership and control still stands. In contrast, Strine
argues that given the high concentration of stocks in institutional investors, the
Berle and Means equation has been reversed, now in favour of stockholders. But
who are they? For one thing, the reality of stock market-based old-age pensions
turns most employees into ‘forced’ capitalists, although they hardly ‘own’
anything directly. The owners are large institutional investors, intermediaries
between employees and the firm.100 At the heart of Strine’s critique, then, is his
——————————————————

96 Arman A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization’, 62 American Economic Review (1972) p. 777; Eugene Fama and Michael C.
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concern with an unceasing flow of literature demanding shareholder empowerment against management that stands in bizarre contrast to the disassociation of
employees’ ownership from exercising long-term, pension-oriented rights vis-àvis ‘their’ corporation. He thus finds it particularly troubling that most of the
current corporate responsibility and corporate governance efforts are made
without the awareness that they eventually serve to empower not those with longterm interests in the viability of the corporation but rather intermediaries with less
clearly demarcated interests, which might frequently be directed towards high
short-term returns than long-term sustained performance.
Immediately contested,101 Strine’s suggestions focus on appropriate means of
shareholder empowerment precisely with the goal of identifying the long-term
orientations of a firm’s strategic outfit in order to disclose to stockholders in
greater detail where a company stands and where its dominating investors intend
to take it.102 Instead of ‘feeding the market beast’, as was the case before the
market meltdown in Enron and Worldcom, efforts should be made to improve
disclosure rules that would ‘enable managers to focus more on sustainable, longterm corporate growth and less on the market’s short-term expectations.’103
Interestingly enough, it is the critic of Strine’s common sense and shared interests
approach who returns the analysis to an atomised interest pluralism model, which
allows him to purportedly dismiss Strine’s contentions regarding such shared
interests. Claiming that the degree of diversity among the different corporate
stakeholders effectively defeats any contention of shared values between the
firm’s constituencies, Bainbridge evades the central challenge that Strine formulates, namely, to recognise that both management and employees share a basic
interest in the sustained success of a business enterprise. Regrettably, for the time
being, Bainbridge dismisses this claim, without pursuing further the idea what it
would mean for our understanding of a firm’s constituencies and the firm itself if
we adopted a more wholesome approach to the firm and its stakeholders.
4.3

Corporate decision making in the knowledge society

In the following, I want to suggest an alternative perspective on the corporation.
For this purpose, I put forward the thesis that neither the contractual nor the
interest pluralism paradigms of the corporation can fully illuminate the internal
workings of the firm. In particular, neither approach can adequately identify or
assess the processes by which knowledge is generated, disseminated and executed
within the corporation or, in other words, which processes in fact precede and
——————————————————

101 Stephen M. Bainbridge, ‘The Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in Corporate
Governance: A Comment on Strine’, UCLA Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper
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inform any decision made by corporate management. While the contract model of
the corporation remains confined to explaining corporate decision making with
regard to agreements among the firm’s stakeholders, even in cases of so-called
‘incomplete contracts’,104 the interest pluralism model of the corporation tends to
one-sidedly focus on identifiable interests of specific stakeholders of the firm,
such as employees, unions or creditors.105 This also appears to be true in the most
recent Strine-Bainbridge dialogue. In contrast, a possibly more promising
perspective on the firm’s institutional nature in making decisions possible could
start with the premise that the elements shaping corporate decisions are never in a
static, foreseeable or fully determinable state. Rather, corporate decision making
by necessity involves a high-risk assessment of uncertain development trajectories, market strategies and product conceptualisations. The complexity of the field
to be assessed by management must be reflected in the way in which we speak
about the regulation of corporate activity. From this perspective, then, the firm
itself moves into the centre of attention. In other words, corporate governance that
claims to effectively address the core challenges of governing a corporation must
take the particular features of a firm’s decision-making processes into consideration.
Accordingly, it is this second complementary perspective that will be unfolded
in more detail in the remainder of this paper. The key to understanding the
contemporary corporation in the political economy of the de-territorialised
knowledge economy is to focus on its capacity to remain innovative.106 The firm’s
capacity to engage in innovative production depends on its ability to constantly
grow, adapt and learn. This it can do by letting go of traditional modes of
command and control and instead embracing an ironic, detached, reflective and
post-heroic attitude to corporate governance and management. The corporation
becomes an ‘interpreting system that constantly observes its environment, its
markets, competitors, customers and suppliers in search of gaps that it may fill
itself. The corporation is under incessant pressure to develop and fill its own
niche while everything else remains in constant change, including its niche.’107
Our urgently sought definition of the corporation’s responsibilities, its public
duties and obligations to society at large, especially in an era of scandalous
corporate crime, depends entirely on our understanding of the firm itself. It is here
that we recognise the relevance for our theme of the fierce battle between
——————————————————

104 For a critique, see William W. Bratton and Joseph A. McCahery, ‘Incomplete Contracts
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shareholder value- oriented systems of corporate control and those that place a
higher emphasis on workers’ voice, participation, industrial relations and a wider
consideration of the firm’s stakeholders.108 Whether we emphasise the shareholder
or the stakeholder dimension of the firm will have a significant impact on our
assignment of duties and obligations to the firm.109 This is particularly relevant
with regard to disclosure.110 In cases where corporate governance reform is
predominantly concerned with shareholders, the emphasis is likely to remain
placed – at least for the time being – on improvements in financial auditing
schemes. In contrast, if we were to focus on an improved environmental accountability of the firm, we would indeed direct our initiatives at other areas of
corporate organisation. In fact, environmental internal auditing constitutes a
prime example of the latter developments in environmental corporate selfregulation.111 In other words, the question of the firm’s responsibilities cannot be
separated from a more refined understanding of the firm in its various, highly
differentiated and specialised contexts.
From the perspective of the firm within a functionally differentiated knowledge society, even the connection made between the political economy of the firm
and the firm’s environmental (or wider social) responsibilities would still provide
only an insufficient account of the corporation itself. Today’s large, publicly held
and globally operating firms escape clear definitions, both with regard to their
core activities or ‘competences’112 and their organisational structure. Increasingly,
firms have become unbounded, borderless and virtual, with activities that span
multiple areas of industry, manufacture, products or services. Echoing many of
the challenges that the state faces today in a complex society, the firm constitutes
a highly complex organisation that operates in a volatile regulatory and competitive environment, which is at its heart characterised by a fast evolving body of
specialised knowledge. We should thus reject both overly simplistic categorisations of the firm as either shareholder- or stakeholder-oriented, as the firm of the
twenty-first century challenges our learned ways of organising social behaviour.
Shifting both the corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the corporate governance debate away from the control-oriented images of the corporation, with its
——————————————————
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focus on the struggle between shareholders and stakeholders, is an essential first
step in beginning to rephrase the question of the firm’s societal functions.
Questioning the definitional clarity of the term ‘social’ in CSR, the firm must be
viewed within a complex web made up of socio-economic, political and cultural
factors, in which the corporation is embedded. The various functions that a
corporation is assuming have repercussions on the evolution of corporate governance well beyond an oppositional model of shareholder v. stakeholder interests.
From the perspective of society as an ongoing communication process of different rationalities, corporate governance can adequately be understood as an
ongoing process of organisational experiments 113 within a constantly evolving
business enterprise, operating in a polycontextual environment. It is in this light
that the ongoing discussion over the convergence or divergence of corporate
governance regimes must take into account the particular embeddedness of the
firm within historically grown, and functionally evolving socio-economic and
political contexts. Today’s corporations are placed within a constantly changing
environment that is determined functionally rather than territorially or politically.
While specific local regulatory influences on the operation of the firm are of
importance, the firm’s corporate governance regime is shaped by the functional
elements of the firm’s operation. For example, with corporations’ increasingly
important assumptions of formerly public functions such as welfare, pensions or
medical care, it has since long become questionable whether a corporation can be
adequately described as either private or public in nature. While such contestations of the nature of the business enterprise already have a considerable legacy,114
the functionalist critique of both the shareholder v. stakeholder paradigm of
corporate governance and the public-private divide in determining the nature of
the firm goes much further still. From the perspective of societal functional
differentiation, it is a mere historical contingency that the discussion of corporate
governance would be dominated – for some time – by such connotations as
‘shareholders’ and ‘stakeholders’, on the one hand, and the public v. private
nature of the corporation, on the other. While varieties of capitalism scholarship
succeeds in reiterating the contextuality of corporate governance development, it
still has to be developed further to move away from contentions of path dependency, and thus upheld claims of persisting divergence, in order to recognise the
complexity in which the business corporation is the collision site of different
societal rationalities.
.
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